A Theoretical Framework for the Protection of Environmental Refugees in International Law by Sahinkuye, Mathias
Masthead Logo The Transnational Human Rights Review
A Theoretical Framework for the Protection of
Environmental Refugees in International Law
Mathias Sahinkuye
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/thr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
Transnational Human Rights Review by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Sahinkuye, Mathias. "A Theoretical Framework for the Protection of Environmental Refugees in International Law." The Transnational
Human Rights Review 6. (2019): 1-.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/thr/vol6/iss1/1
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 








This article analyzes the reality and the criteria for the legal protection of environmental refugees. 
Using an interdisciplinary approach, it addresses questions about the existence, nature, 
universality, justification, and legal status of environmental refugees. Despite the lively debates 
within the community of experts and scientists specializing in migration and/or environmental 
issues, there is no consensus today on a definition of the term “environmental refugees” since 
1985 when it officially appeared. Several descriptions such as ecological refugees, environmental 
refugees, climate refugees, eco-refugees, climate évacué, environmental migrants, displaced 
persons due to a natural disaster, environmentally displaced persons, etc. have been used without 
due regard to the still complex and little-known reality lying behind them. The debate on proper 
description has stalled, jeopardizing the legal recognition and concomitant protection. Regardless, 
over the past seventeen years, there has been a proliferation of actions militating for the 
recognition and protection of environmental refugees. The promotion of this concept as well as its 
content raises several questions: Does the concept of environmental refugees not undermine the 
subtle edifice established by the 1951 Refugee Convention? Does it not overturn the right of 
asylum? But above all, can today’s law provide protections for these “refugees”? Have policies 
fostered the need for protection?  The paper argues that the phenomenon of environmental 
refugees is a timely illustration of a larger ongoing global development. It is important, in this 
regard, to rethink the environment in new ways, especially in terms of liability and providing 
legal protection to victims of environmental catastrophes. A new regime must certainly involve 
the adaptation and invention of concepts and especially the creation of new legal mechanisms 
suited to this complexity.  
 
I. WHILE NUMEROUS ACADEMIC STUDIES have been increasingly performed 
concerning environmental refugee law over the past two decades,1 there is a dearth of academic 
                                                          
* Senior Research Fellow, African Institute of International Law, Arusha-Tanzania; Professor of International Law 
and Legal Scholarship, University of Iringa.  
1 E.F. Kunz, “The Refugee in flight: Kinetic models and forms of displacement” (1973) 7:2 Intl Migration Rev 124; 
J. Glassman, “Counter-insurgency, Ecocide and the Production of Refugees: Warfare as a Tool of Modernization” 
(1992) 12:1 Refuge: Canada’s Periodical on Refugees 27; A. Perout, “Environmental Refugees: Defining 
Environmental Migrants and Long Term Solutions to Deal with Environmental Migration” (Master’s Thesis in 
Geography, Montreal: Concordia University, 1995); R. Black & M. F. Sessay, “Forced Migration, Environmental 
Change, and Woodfuel Issues in the Senegal River Valley, (1997) 24 Env Conservation 251; N. Myers, 
“Environmental Refugees, in Population and Environment” (1997) 19 J of Interdisciplinary Studies 167; R. Black, 
Refugees, Environment, and Development (Singapore: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998); J.B. Cooper, 
“Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition” (1998) 6:2 NYU Env LJ 480; M.S. 
Brooks, “Environmentally Induced Migration: Beyond a Culture of Reaction” (2000) 14 Geo Immigr LJ 855; D.C. 
Bates “Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change” (2002) 23:5 
Population and Environment 465-477; D. Keane, “The Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration: A 
Search for the Meaning of ‘Environmental Refugees’” (2004) 16 Geo Int'1 Envtl L Rev 209; C.M. Kozoll, 
“Poisoning the Well: Persecution, the Environment, and Refugee Status” (2004) 15 Colo J Int'l Envtl L & Pol'y  
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literature on the philosophical and legal foundations for the protection of environmental 
refugees. Most of the current scholarship, revolving around the gaps in international refugee, 
environmental, and human rights law with regard to the protection of environmental refugees,2 
are characterized by a division between environment and migration specialists who adopt often 
conflicting positions3 with regard to the responses to be provided.4 In this regard, two schools of 
thought have been identified. First is the ‘maximalist’ school whose proponents5 describe large 
numbers of existing environmental refugees and predict greater numbers in the future, thus 
conceiving of the link between changes in the physical environment and human migration as 
simply causative and direct. Second is the ‘minimalist’ school which emphasizes the complex 
interaction between environmental and social systems, and thus questions the assumption of a 
direct causal link between environmental change and migration.6  
Moreover, in recent years, experts and academics7—all disciplines combined—have 
focused, above all, on debates around terminology and definitions. Should we speak of 
“migrants”, “refugees”, “displaced” or simply of mobility or exodus, etc.? Should we reduce the 
debate around climate refugees, understood as climate change victims, or include environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
271; V. Vikram Kolmannskog, “The Point of No Return: Exploring Law on Cross-Border Displacement in the 
Context of Climate Change” (2009) 34 Refugee Watch 27; E. Jakobsson, “Global Policy Making on Climate 
Refugees: What is the Problem?” (2010) 19, online: <https://www.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1309/1309786vt10-elin-
jakobsson.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2018); L.W. Marshall, “Toward a New Definition of ‘Refugee’: Is the 1951 
Convention Out of Date?” (2011) 37 EJTES 61; C.M. Kozoll, “One Good Reason to Speak of Climate Refugees” 
(2015) 49 FMR 70; S. Jolly & N. Ahmad, “Climate Refugees Under International Climate Law and International 
Refugee Law: Towards Addressing the Protection Gaps and Exploring the Legal Alternatives for Criminal Justice” 
(2015) 14 ISIL YB Int’l Human & Refugee L 216 at 248; J.R. Wennersten & D. Robbins, Rising Tides: Climate 
Refugees in the Twenty-First Century (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2017). 
2 Roger Zetter & Heloise Ruaudel, “Climate Change and Displacement” (10 July 2018), Forced Migration Review 
No 31, Oxford University Podcasts, online: <https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/keywords/forced-migration-review> at 80. 
3 François Gemenne, “Migration et Environnement, état des Savoirs sur une Relation Méconnue”, Les Journées 
d’Études du GISTI, (17 Décembre 2007), online : <https://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/je_08refugies-
environnementaux.pdf> at 5; J. Barnett & M. Webber, “Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to 
Climate Change”  (Policy Research Working Paper 5270, University of Melbourne, 2009); Silja Klepp, Climate 
Change and Migration”  Online Publication Date Apr 2017 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.013.42. 
4 “The literature on climate change and migration is generally very pessimistic about mobility arising from climate 
change. This creates a starting point bias in thinking about policy responses, eschewing the development of policies 
that seek to harness migration as a strategy to promote adaptation to climate change…” See Barnett and Webber, 
supra note 3 at 19. 
5 E. Mainly El-Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, 1985); J. 
Jacobson, Environmental Refugees: A Yardstick of Habitability (Washington DC: World Watch Institute, 1988). 
6 The proponents of the minimalist school are mainly R. Bilsborrow, Rural Poverty, “Migration, and the 
Environment in Developing Countries: Three Case Studies” in Background paper for World Development Report 
(Washington: The World Bank, 1992); J. McGregor, “Climate Change and Involuntary Migration: Implications for 
Food Security” (1994) 19:2 Food Policy 120; A. Suhrke, “Environmental Degradation and Population Flows” 
(1994) 47:2 J of Intl Affairs 47(2), 473. 
7 See for example Brooks supra note 2; Bates, supra note 2; Jakobsson, supra note 2; and Marshall, supra note 2. 




or ecological refugees, including victims of things like natural disasters, development projects, 
industrial disasters, etc.?8 
In 2005, some environmental law jurists9 issued a call10 for the recognition of an 
international legal status for ecological refugees. Similarly, at the end of 2007, a report11 
produced by a group of academics and experts proposed a reflection on global governance for 
climate refugees. A research program called EACH-FOR12 and experts from the United Nations 
University also published a number of documents13 on population displacements due to 
environmental degradation. Moreover, the expert group of the German Advisory Council on 
Global Change14 (WBGU) also highlighted, in a report entitled “Climate Change as a Security 
Risk”,15 the issue of climate displacement by means of international security. 
The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations 
Environmental Program (UNDP) have engaged experts16 to evaluate the issue, preferring to 
focus the debate on “displaced persons” rather than referring to the term “refugees” which the 
UNHCR especially says is an abuse of language. In their judgment, the legal concept of 
“refugee” refers only to beneficiaries of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees. Finally, in January 2008, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
                                                          
8 James Morrissey refers even to persons “whose decision to move is based, in part, on the experience of 
environmental stress”. J. Morrissey, “Rethinking the 'Debate on Environmental Refugees': From 'Maximilists and 
Minimalists' to 'Proponents and Critics'” (2012) 19 J of Political Ecology 36. 
9 Members of the International Center for Comparative Environmental Law online: <https://cidce.org/>; and the 
Centre de Recherches Interdisciplinaires en Droit de l’Environnement, de l’Aménagement et de l’Urbanisme online: 
<http://www.unilim.fr/crideau/>. 
10 Limoges Call on Ecological Refugees, 23 June 2005 online: <https://cidce.org/>. 
11 F. Biermann & I. Boas “Preparing for a Warmer World, Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate 
Refugees” (2010) 10:1 Global Env Pol 60. 
12 CCEMA, “Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR)” online: <http://www.ccema-
portal.org/article/read/each-for-project-publications>.  
13 F. Renaud, J.J Bogardi, O. Dun, and K. Warner, Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration? 
(Germany: UNU-EHS, 2007). 
14 An independent, scientific advisory body, WBGU’s principal tasks are to analyze global environment and 
development problems and report on these, review and evaluate national and international research in the field of 
global change, provide early warning of new issue areas, identify gaps in research and to initiate new research, 
monitor and assess national and international policies for the achievement of sustainable development, elaborate 
recommendations for action and research and raise public awareness and heighten the media profile of global 
change issues. 
15 WBGU, Climate Change and Security Risk, (United Kingdom: Earthscan, 2008) at 204-207. 
16 K.E. McNamara, “The Politics of Environmental Protection at the United Nations” (UNSW Sydney Australia: 
Doctoral Thesis, 2006) at 361. 
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published a report on migration and the environment17 in which it developed a “working 
definition”. The group used the description “environmental migrants”, to refer to  
Persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive 
changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are 
obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or 
permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.18 
Definitions like this one come amidst others focusing mainly on issues ranging from 
climate migration,19 to the contemporary picture of the refugee.20 They also cover the figure of 
exiles and refugees,21 challenges in providing legal status for environmentally displaced people 
in international law,22 the relationship between environmental crises and human migration,23 
climate refugees and security,24 and the responsibility for climate refugees.25 
                                                          
17 O. Brown, Migration and Climate Change (Geneva: IOM, 2008) at 64. 
18 IOM and UNFPA, “Expert Seminar: Migration and the Environment” (2008) 10 International Dialogue on 
Migration at 23. 
19 K. Kartiki, “Climate Change and Migration: A Case Study From Rural Bangladesh” (2011) 19:1 Gender and 
Development 23; Morrissey, supra note 8. 
20 C.B. Ruiz, “Les réfugiés, seuil éthique d’un nouveau droit et d’une nouvelle politique”, (2014) 6 La Revue des 
droits de l’homme. 
21 G. Agamben, “Homo sacer. O poder soberano e a vida nua, Belo Horizonte” (2002) UFMG 175. 
22 Jean-Jacques Parfait Poumo Leumbe. Les déplacés environnementaux : problématique de la recherche d’un statut 
juridique en droit international. Droit. Université de Limoges, 2015; E. Piguet, A. Pécoud and P. De Guchteneire 
(eds.) Migration and Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 74-101; P.S. Jaswal, and 
S. Jolly, “Climate Refugees: Challenges and Opportunities for International Law” (2013) 55:1 J of the Indian Law 
Inst 45; M. Lister, “Climate Change Refugees” (2014) 17:5 Critical Rev of Intl Soc and Pol Phil 618. 
23 A. Westing, “Environmental Refugees: A Growing Category of Displaced Persons” (1992) 19:3 Environmental 
Conservation 201; A. Westing, “Population, Desertification, and Migration” (1994) 21:2 Environmental 
Conservation 109; M. Islam, “Natural Calamities and Environmental Refugees in Bangladesh” (1992) 12:1 Refuge: 
Canada's Periodical on Refugees 5; O. Otunnu, “Environmental Refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and 
Effects” (1992) 12:1 Refuge: Canada's periodical on refugees 11; J. Trolldalen, N. Birkeland, J. Borgen, P. Scott, 
and G. Coles, Environmental Refugees: A Discussion Paper (Norway: World Foundation for Environment & 
Development, 1992); A. Suhrke, “Environmental Degradation and Population Flows” (1994) 47:2 J of Intl Affairs 
473; R. Ramlogan, “Environmental Refugees: A Review” (1996) 23 Environmental Conservation 81; S. O'Lear, 
“Migration and the Environment: A Review of Recent Literature” (1997) 78:2 Soc Sci Q 606; S. Castles, 
“Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the Debate” (New Issues in Refugee Research, 
Working Paper No. 70) (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2002) online:  
<http://tinyurl.com/cjrr4cy>; E. Goffman, “Environmental Refugees: How Many, How Bad?” (2006) CSA 
Discovery Guides, ProQuest; K. McNamara, “Conceptualizing Discourses on Environmental Refugees at the United 
Nations” (2007) 29 Population and Environment 2; Christian Aid, Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis (London: 
Christian Aid, 2007); S. Rajan, Blue Alert: Climate Migrants in South Asia (India: Greenpeace, 2008); K. Campbell, 
Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Climate Change (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2008); S. Perch-Nielsen, M. Bättig and D. Imboden, “Exploring the Link Between 
Climate Change and Migration” (2008) 91:3 Climatic Change 375; F. Laczko, “Migration, Environment and 
Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence” (2009) The German Marshal Fund of the United States; J. Morrissey, 
“Environmental Change and Forced Migration” (Workshop on Environmental Change and Forced Migration, 
January 8 & 9 2009) (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2009); N. Gill, “‘Environmental 
Refugees’: Key Debates and the Contributions of Geographers” (2010) 4:7 Geography Compass 861; A. Panda, 
Climate Refugees: Implications for India” (2010) XLV:20 Economic and Political Weekly 76; P. Bohra-Mishra, and 
D. Massey “Environmental Degradation and Out-Migration: Evidence From Nepal” in E. Piguet, A. Pécoud and P. 




Despite the absence of a deep philosophical reflection on the subject, the recent 
acceleration of studies, reports, expertise and research on the topic reveals the extent to which 
the academic community is reflecting on this complex issue to which the decision makers have 
not yet found an effective solution. It is precisely the absence of a philosophical evaluation that 
could prolong the confusion regarding the protection of environmental refugees, especially since 
most of the studies insist on legal recognition of environmental migrants and the creation of a 
new category of refugees.  
The suggestion of a new category of “environmental refugees” warrants critical reflection 
and questioning to shed light on the foundations of current law and enlightening the feasibility of 
environmental refugee protection de lege ferenda. The purpose of this article is therefore to 
explain, predict, and understand the underpinnings of a human rights-approach as basis for 
environmental refugee protection. I will address the following questions: Who are environmental 
refugees and how can they be characterized? What values are involved in this characterization? 
What special needs do environmental refugees have? Can the international legal system address 
them?  
These questions are based on the fact that refugees and environment are part of the same 
conception of that responsibility expressed by the Stockholm Conference in 1972 when it was 
said that “man has a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage (...) now 
gravely imperiled by a combination of adverse factors”,26 involving awareness and acceptance of 
the consequences of human behavior. The point is to match up the concepts of law in order to 
determine whether their recombination offers a more coherent picture of reality, which would 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
De Guchteneire (eds.) Migration and Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 74-101; F. 
Gemmene, “How They Became the Human Face of Climate Change: Research and Policy Interactions in the Birth 
of the 'Environmental Migration' Concept” in E. Piguet, A. Pécoud and P. De Guchteneire (eds.) Migration and 
Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 225-259; S. Carvalho, “What Has Climate 
Change Got To Do With Human Rights?” (Amnesty International, 2015) online: 
<www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/12/climate-change-human-rights/>. 
24 T. Doyle and S. Chaturvedi, Climate Refugees and Security: Conceptualizations, Categories, and Contestations 
(Oxford: Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, 2011). 
25 Biermann, supra note 11; T.T.V. Duong, “When Islands Drown: The Plight of ‘Climate Change Refugee’ and 
Recourse to International Human Rights Law” (2010) 31 U Pa J Int’l L 1240; K. Andrews, “Colonial Nostalgia is 
Back in Fashion, Blinding Us to the Horrors of Empire” (Guardian News and Media Limited, London, 2016); B. 
Ahmed, “Who Takes Responsibility for the Climate Refugees?” (2018) 10:1 Intl J of Climate Change Strategies and 
Management online: <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCCSM-10-2016-0149>. 
26 “Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment” (Stockholm, June 1972) online: 
<http://www.un-documents.net/unchedec.htm>. 
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allow the legal instrument to serve the “destiny and common aspirations of humanity”27 to its 
needs. Indeed, while the concept of refugee is based on a well-established legal basis, it now 
appears too narrow in light of recent situations;28 rethinking it is all the more necessary since we 
now combine it with the environment concept. 
Whereas refugee protection appears well established in international law, its values are 
rooted both in history and in the imagination of men. The reception and humane treatment of 
refugees has always constituted a significant value of any society—from the Mosaic Law to 
indigenous customs, religious practices and moral rules. The rules permitted the welcoming of 
foreigners and the persecuted, be they alone or in groups. As Edward Feser put it, this virtue is 
rooted in both “religious faith and secular principles”.29 Recently, the religious basis for 
welcoming strangers which had long dominated in different societies seems to fade in favor of 
solidarity. The legal protection of refugees is thus premised on Judeo-Christian principles 
pertaining to welcoming the stranger, moral solidarity, uniting men and placing “refugees under 
the responsibility of the whole of humanity”.30  
The article is organized as follows: In section I, I discuss the values of charity and 
solidarity as well as the concept of humanity considered as the foundations for effective legal 
protection of refugees. In Section II, I propose legal protection based on the “collective” status of 
environmental refugees. This thinking will not distinguish between the causes of the departure or 
the disaster, but acts on their consequences. This is unlike the refugee status under the 1951 
Convention and subsequent instruments which are confined to an individual procedure or a 
procedure with individual tendencies, which, I argue, are inadequate as to empty the envisaged 
protection regime of substance. 
II. FROM CHARITY TO SOLIDARITY: THE FOUNDATIONS FOR LEGAL 
PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 
The phenomenon of human mobility today does often involve suffering caused by the inevitable 
uprooting of persons from their countries. Every person has “the right not to emigrate, that is, to 
                                                          
27 “Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future” (UN Documents) 
online: <www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf>. 
28 See Bohra-Mishra and Massey, supra note 23; Campbell, supra note 23; and Castles, supra note 23.  
29 E. Feser, The Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction, (OneWorld Publications, 2005). 
30 D.S.J. Hollenbach, “Borders and Duties to the Displaced: Ethical Perspectives on the Refugee Protection System” 
(2016) 4:3 J on Migration and Human Security 148. 




live in peace and dignity in [their] own homeland”.31 However, some people are forced to move 
because of, inter alia, persecutions, natural calamities, environmental disasters or other factors 
that cause extreme hardships, even to the peril of their lives, and/or they can no longer live with 
dignity. Refugees and others who have been forced to leave their country have always been a 
challenge for communities that would receive them while the exigency to receive and treat 
refugees with dignity emanates from the consciousness of human fraternity. This involves the 
concept of humanity construed for the benefit of the victims of persecution, while the moral 
solidarity uniting men places, in a way, the refugees under the responsibility of the entire 
humanity. It is therefore a question of how to apply the values of charity and solidarity. 
A. CHARITY AS A RELIGIOUS VALUE 
Scholarship32 explains charity as, since the advent of the Christian religion, a high theological 
virtue consisting in the love of God and that of the neighbor in view of God. Charity 
compensates the effects of inequality, calling for compassion for the poor, the destitute, the 
psychologically and physically wounded who are, however, required to take their pain, 
redemption coming with eternal life. But this charity fails to question its reasons for being which 
are in the established order.33 
To this extent, the great monastic orders, especially the Benedictines, provided care for 
the sick and poor stray by creating homes and leper colonies, welcoming the stray because they 
did not come from their monasteries or give up any of their privilege nor any of their wealth in 
the name of charity.34 The Cistercians will revive, in the twelfth century, the tradition of poverty 
                                                          
31 Jean-Paul II, JMMR 2004, n° 3 : O.R., édition hebdomadaire en langue française, 23 décembre 2003, 2. 
32 Ryan Lincoln, Christopher A. Morrissey, Peter Mundey, “Religious Giving: A Literature Review” (2008) Science 
of Generosity 2; E.L. Queen, “The Religious Roots of Philanthropy in the West: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam” 
(Working Paper Series, 96-4) (Indianapolis: Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, 1996); J.D. Davidson, & 
R.E. Pyle, “Passing the Plate in Affluent Churches: Why Some Members Give More Than Others” (1994) 36:2 
Review of Religious Research 181; N. Krause, “Altruism, Religion, and Health: Exploring the Ways in Which 
Helping Others Benefits Support Providers” in Stephen G. Post (ed.) Altruism and Health: Perspectives from 
Empirical Research (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 410-421; J. Peifer, “Religious Giving as a 
Response to Community” (Working Paper 42, Center for the Study of Economy and Society) online: 
<http://www.economyandsociety.org/publications/wp42_peifer_07.pdf>. 
33 Lincoln et al, supra note 32 at 21. 
34 Dwight Longenecker, Saint Benedict for Busy Parents (New Haven: Knights of Columbus Supreme Council, 
2008). 
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and generosity of the monastic orders.35 Saint Francis of Assisi will be found, in the following 
century, the mendicant orders, practice, beforehand, of the revolutionary charity without naming 
it and without too much calling to revolt against the established order.36 Meanwhile, Jesuits 
started and continued their apostolate worldwide: providing healthcare, educating and protecting 
the converted Indians by allowing them, however, to keep their primitive culture. They 
welcomed, depending on events, refugees, the sick, the stray, the hunted.37 From the seventeenth 
century onwards, the Brothers and Sisters of Charity worked to implement the charity as 
understood by Saint Vincent de Paul, founder of the first apostolic order of women, up to then 
still in the convent.38 
Charity, thus understood, consisted in an interpretation of the holy texts.39 Recently, 
charity has been envisaged in a disruptive way, respectful of the established order; it is, then, 
justice: every believer can take the defense of the poor in the name of Christ who has always 
presented himself as the defender of the poor, the persecuted and the banished. This 
interpretation leads necessarily to the questioning of the social order.40 Liberation Theology 
commends, in this context, charity raised against an unjust established order: Dom Helder 
Camara, Archbishop of Recife, Brazil, maintained radical positions for the defense of the rights 
of the poor through non-violent methods.41 This was relayed in France by the speech of Father 
Pierre, or Father Delorme.42  
However, the Church does not have any more the monopoly of this action whose 
foundation has shifted, from charity, religious virtue, to solidarity, secular value. Numbers of 
people and non-religious associations are fighting every day to help the needy.43 The association 
                                                          
35 Ibid. 
36 Father Candide Chalippe, “The Life and Legends of Saint Francis of Assisi” (Blackmask, 2002) online: 
<http://www.blackmask.com>. 
37 G.B. Nicolini, History of the Jesuits: Their Origin, Progress, Doctrines and Designs (California: HardPress 
Publishing, 2013) at 592. 
38 A Scripture Rule for the Brothers and Sisters of Charity at Little Portion Hermitage (Berryville, The Brothers and 
Sisters of Charity, 1985). 
39 International Theological Commission, “Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles 
and Criteria” online: 
<http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_doc_20111129_teologia-
oggi_en.html>. 
40 J. Peifer, “Religious Giving as a Response to Community” (Working Paper 42, Center for the Study of Economy 
and Society) online: <http://www.economyandsociety.org/publications/wp42_peifer_07.pdf>. 
41 J. Hoffman French, “A Tale Of Two Priests: Three Decades of Liberation Theology in the Brazilian Northeast” 
(Kellog Institute: Working Paper 328, October 2006). 
42 Ibid. 
43 E. Ferris, “Faith-Based and Secular Humanitarian Organizations” (2005) 87:858 Intl Rev of the Red Cross 311. 




movement, prerogative of democratic societies, functioning as a “salutary social buffer” appears 
as an efficient counter-power, born of the individual momentum, replacing deficient public 
structures.44 Charity, formerly established by religious orders, turns into a mosaic of international 
development and cooperation resulting in changes on the perspective and the purpose of the 
action taken. The religious value of charity is therefore replaced gradually by the secular value of 
solidarity. 
B. SOLIDARITY AS A MORAL VALUE 
In their Anthology of Interracial Literature, David Goodman Croly and George Wakeman 
endeavor to make plain the proposition that “as by the teaching of science, religion, and 
democracy, the whole human race is of one family, it follows that there should be no distinction 
in … rights on account of color, race, or nativity, in a republic”.45 This proposition confirms the 
undeniable fact that the rise of human rights after World War II was prefigured and inspired by a 
defense of the dignity of the human person that first arose in Christian churches and religious 
thought in the years just prior to the outbreak of the war. From this perspective, we can say that 
refugees, migrants, mobility people and the local population, all form one family. From there, 
human solidarity and charity should not exclude any person, culture or people.46 The most 
vulnerable are not just people in need for whom we are acting in solidarity, but they are members 
of our family, to whom we have a duty to share the resources we have. 
In domestic law, solidarity refers to a precise legal situation, expanding to the 
international plane, and it is, in addition, a moral value. The evolution of the world, or the 
awareness of its finitude, its complexity and the interdependence of its animate and inanimate 
elements, leads to the conception of a common fate for all humans. The increasing 
interdependence being coupled with the increase of his conscience, man leaves his physical 
isolation by the development of means of high-speed transportation and communication, as well 
as his intellectual isolation by recognizing the common destiny that awaits humanity. Man is for 
the first time confronted with fundamental questions which he cannot decide alone but of which 
                                                          
44 N. Ormerod and S. Clifton, Globalization and the Mission of the Church (London: T & T Clark, 2009) at 167. 
45 W. Sollors, B. Henry and A.M. Cabot (eds.) An Anthology of Interracial Literature: Black-White Contacts in the 
Old World and the New (New York: NYU Press, 2004) at 675. 
46 T. Balasuriva, “Globalization and Human Solidarity” online: <https://www.religion-online.org/book-
chapter/chapter-9-human-solidarity-in-the-context-of-globalization/>. 
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it is up to everyone to participate in the progression. Solidarity between humans reappears, 
renewed by the gravity and urgency of possible dangers. 
Challenging the idea of a “natural” inequality, Enlightenment thinkers discovered 
equality: men are born and remain equal; liberty and fraternity: all human beings, whatever their 
differences are humans and can rise by education. They contribute thus to renew the political 
systems, from monarchy to the republic, as well as to establish the principles of the new order.47 
The freedom of association was so strongly proclaimed as well by the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 as by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1791, 
and finally consecrated in article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is a pillar 
of any democratic system and therefore largely protected or restricted. 
The association movement48 is today an essential link, particularly in our post-industrial 
societies where the State is no longer providential. In the North, the over-development of 
capitalism created new forms of exclusion which developed through the cracks of all nets. In 
poorer countries, the associative network49 overcame the shortcomings of the State in areas as 
diverse as funding support projects to cushion the effects of unemployment, sickness, loss or 
failure of citizenship, the establishment of networks of solidarity for specific or broader purpose, 
as well as in the area of environment, health and education in particular. 
The result is a profusion of solidarity networks whose diversity is amazing as it does not 
appear reserved for rich countries but is extended also to the South where associations 
proliferate50. Active solidarity of men is fed of small daily actions enabling some to survive, 
others to regain their dignity, others again to relearn the group’s strength and hope every day. 
This form of secular assistance is based on a rediscovery of the common destiny of men and their 
capacity increased by the group, to force destiny. 
At the international level, solidarity borrows from somewhat different forms because, 
inter alia, addressing the States, the offer of international assistance can, in principle, be denied. 
The debate seems, however, to have in recent years, evolved from the ground of interference to 
that of humanitarian. This shift reflects a lesser concern to encroach on the internal affairs of a 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 A. Mitchell, “The Association Movement of 1792-3” (1961) 4:1 The Historical Journal 56. 
49 A. Paliwal, “Extending Associative Network Theory: The Role of Affect in the Bi-Directional Image Transfer 
Process” (Theses and Dissertations, 2014) at 44 online:  <https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_oa/44>. 
50 Ibid. 




State, and a strengthened will to intervene in any situation qualified as humanitarian, which term 
includes, where applicable, crises whose causes are political.51 
The European Community has inscribed its approach to the forefront of this evolution of 
the doctrine of international public aid. It clearly put that humanitarian aid it provides is intended 
“to people in distress” who “have the right to receive humanitarian assistance”. The operations of 
Community assistance are thus not meant for the affected State or its government, decisions on 
the matter being taken “solely according to the needs and interests of victims”.52 
These developments clearly illustrate the concept of solidarity implemented by the 
international community and the transformation of its principles relayed by States. Refugees are 
a good example of the diversity which, by manifesting itself, can borrow solidarity. It has never 
failed in this area, except in western countries which, wishing to stick to a narrow reading of the 
1951 Convention, refused to put the issue of refugees on the moral ground of fraternity and 
solidarity.53 
Solidarity is, however, one of the key words of the Preamble to the Statute of UNHCR of 
1950 and, although the term does not appear in the text of the 1951 Convention, it is, 
nonetheless, affirmed as the mainstay of public and private international action in this area, 
countries implement the moral solidarity uniting men. There is, however, another form of 
solidarity, a specific legal situation that leaves nothing to the good will or the morale of the 
parties. 
III. SHIFTING THE PARADIGM FOR EFFECTIVE LEGAL PROTECTION 
 
Although the twenty-first century is by necessity oriented towards the environment and 
periodically signaled through natural disasters, environmental vulnerability is still a major 
challenge. People whose environments are destroyed by ecological disasters remain largely 
ignored at the global level. Do people facing such disasters have a status under international law? 
                                                          
51 See however A.A. Abdullahi & J. Amzat, 211, on the controversies embedded in foreign aid and account for the 
socio-institutional factors responsible for aid failure. 
52 European Commission, “The Union’s Humanitarian Aid: Fit for Purpose? Stakeholders Consultation Documents” 
online: <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consultations/20121210_Fit-for-purpose.pdf>. 
53 V. Moreno-Lax, “Solidarity’s Reach: Meaning, Dimensions, and Implications for EU (External) Asylum Policy” 
(2017) 24:5 Maastricht J of Eur and Comp L 740; J. Allsopp, “Contesting Fraternité—Vulnerable Migrants and the 
Politics of Protection in Contemporary France” (Working Paper Series No. 82, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford 
Department of International Development, July 2012). 
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How can international law guarantee their dignity, security, the right to life? My aim in this 
section is to consider the situation of populations affected by ecological disasters and to outline a 
proposal for an international status guaranteeing them protection and dignity. 
The premise for this proposal is simple. Ecological disasters are major events that 
seriously disrupt the order of things, and produces major losses to affected areas and to the 
populations concerned. Ecological disasters destroy the environment or render it so dangerous 
that the survival of the population living there is under threat. International legal norms hesitate 
to fix the term for this reality,54 although the phenomenon is real. I will use the term ecological 
disaster to designate a risk that induces serious consequences for man, considered collectively, 
and for the environment. 
The cause of the disaster is irrelevant here as it is to be considered ex ante, i.e., from the 
perspective of precaution and prevention. This perspective is outdated insofar as once the 
disaster has occurred, attention moves to the effects that it has or may have on human beings. It 
is true that the cause of the disaster is important as regards the question of responsibility, but the 
issue here is less about pinpointing the causes than taking care of the victim population.55 That is 
why I will focus on these questions: Who are the victims of the ecological disaster? How can 
they be characterized? What special needs do they have? Can the international legal system 
address them? The proposal for an international status of environmental refugees offers a ground 
to explore some solutions. 
A. WHO ARE THE VICTIMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS? 
The link between environmental disasters and the victims of other environmental harms56 is 
singular because it is impossible, in most cases, to link a cause to a consequence. This link is not 
just confined in a recognizable fact. There is a chain of causality that results from the 
interdependence of the elements of the environment and various kinds of human activity. This 
                                                          
54 The terms of major accidents, natural disasters, man-made disaster, cataclysm, damage or super injury are 
variously used. They cover a wide range of phenomena, often differently qualified with regard to their causes, while 
these causes produce similar or comparable effects, A. Gresh, (ed.) Planet in Peril: An Atlas of Current Threats to 
People and the Environment (Paris: Le Monde diplomatique, 2006) at 38. 
55 A. Jacquard, “Moi et les Autres, initiation à la génétique” (1983) Éditions du Seuil, coll. Virgule at 111; V. 
Magniny “Les réfugiés de l’environnement : hypothèse juridique à propos d’une menace écologique” (PhD Thesis, 
Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, June 1999) at 645. 
56 The term victim in this article refers to a community: all the people who were at the place where the disaster 
occurred and transformed inhabitants into victims. The mutation, the passage from person to victim, or from 
inhabitant to victim could, if it was dug, prove interesting. 




causal chain could make the environment unfit for human life or otherwise dangerous as in the 
case of serious pollution. The environment could also be destroyed by soil aridity or 
acidification.57 This is different from a sudden disastrous event. 
When disaster strikes, the entire population residing in the area affected by the disaster is 
threatened by its effects. Unlike the damage that reaches specific persons, the impact reaches 
equally all those who are in the perimeter of the disaster. To that extent the disaster could be said 
to be neutral, which is the same as saying that it is indifferent to the identity of individual 
victims. It occurs in a given place at a given time, and all those present in this place at this time 
are equally victims of the disaster. There is no place in the world today that is safe from 
ecological disasters, and this reality underlines the neutral and collective nature of disasters. 
Every place on earth can be, at one time or another, the scene of a disaster, predictable or not.58 
The characteristics of certain populations or segments of population can help to minimize 
or increase exposure to disasters. It is common, for example, for the poorest populations of large 
cities to live in the most prone areas, such as hills, banks of rivers, and industrial peripheries 
while the wealthy live generally in better built, less polluted neighborhoods, distant from 
industrial centers. Regardless, violence and disasters could sweep away these seeming 
advantages in seconds. The emergency situation that disasters represent erodes social, cultural, 
and economic differences. It acts as a common denominator by placing all victims on an equal 
footing. The entire population is in an emergency situation, the alternatives being either fleeing 
to survive or dying on the spot. 
Victims of environmental disasters are threatened by the extreme events which force 
them to flee their homes. We see here the idea of a refugee which could be internal within a 
country or external when those affected are forced into exile, thereby leaving a territory that once 
was home to seek asylum and survival elsewhere.59 This could be a proper situation to talk about 
“environmental victims” or “environmental refugee”? 
                                                          
57 F. Ramade, Eléments d’écologie, T.2, Ecologie appliquée : action de l’homme su la biosphère (Paris: McGraw-
Hill, 1982) at 452. 
58 On the various disasters typically presented according to their origin, see J. Sørensen, et al., “Natural Hazards and 
Disasters Drawing on the International Experiences From Disaster Reduction in Developing Countries” (Report, 
NIBR, 2006).  
59 Biermann, supra note 11; McNamara, supra note 16; McNamara, supra note 23. 
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B. CHARACTERISTIC OF THE VICTIMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS 
Victims of environmental disasters have unique identifying features. They are collective victims 
as earlier stated; they are displaced, and they are displaced by environmental causes. When 
environmental disasters happen, we speak not of singular victims, but of victim populations. The 
individual is engulfed by the disaster and melts within a mass of other victims. All the people 
that make up this group are affected but cannot be identified or considered individually. The 
disappearance of the individual within a group is therefore characteristic of the ecological 
disaster itself. 
In some contexts, international law has recognized the concept of collective victimhood. 
For example, the Preamble to the United Nations Charter proclaims “We the peoples of the 
United Nations” by which all humanity is recognized as a collective. The same understanding 
could be found in the International Convention Against Genocide,60 the International Convention 
against Racial Discrimination,61 and Article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and its First Optional Protocol.62 These instruments recognize that a group of 
people could be victims of serious violations of human rights.  
In addition to the collective nature of their circumstance, victims of ecological disasters 
are also often displaced. The population within the area that the disaster occurred must flee to a 
safer place where the environment is intact. The displacement of the affected population is both 
spatial and temporal. The emergency situation controls the flight to safety. The victims grab what 
they can take and flee as quickly as possible to a place beyond the scope of the disaster. The 
displacement is therefore in space as it is impossible to predict that this will be the case prior to 
the disaster occurring. It cannot also be predicted how far the movement to a safe place will be. 
Will it be domestic (within the country where the disaster took place) or international (which is 
                                                          
60 Genocide Convention, 9 December 1984, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1953). 
61 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 660 
UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969).  
62 The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, beginning to be widely known 
to the public, we have witnessed the proliferation of communications from individuals complaining of violations of 
their rights by their States. The Human Rights Committee decisions made under the Optional Protocol have helped 
to change the jurisdiction of some States. In a number of cases, prisoners were released and compensation was given 
to the victim whose rights were violated. In 1990, the Committee instituted a mechanism by which it seeks to 
observe more closely the attitude of States Parties on measures taken to give effect to its decisions; State cooperation 
was encouraging to see the document on the website of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, online: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/french>. 




to another country)? If international, how will the victims be treated under international law? I 
answer this question next.  
IV.  LEGAL PROTECTION DE LEGE FERENDA 
 
How can international law respond to the reality of environmental victimhood and what status 
should be accorded to environmental refugees? This question calls for numerous practical and 
legal sub-questions including, but not limited to the following: Who will host the populations of 
today’s sovereign Pacific islands when the rise in sea level will condemn them to exile? Where 
will the populations of deltas and coasts nibbled and swallowed by the increase in the water level 
flee to? Which States will host the peoples of the Far North deprived of land by ice melt, or the 
people of Africa threatened by floods, landslides and droughts? The list of environmental 
disasters likely to drive people from their homes are numerous.63 While the challenge of such 
disasters is humanitarian in small part, it is also political in the sense that it combines ethical, 
social and common-values questions regarding international law.  
It may seem that victims of environmental disasters are close to the classical notion of 
refugees. Yet refugee status is already strictly defined in international law. The question 
therefore is whether it is possible to tailor-make refugee status for environmental disaster victims 
based on the elements of current international law in force. The answer to this question is 
inspired by the principle of humanity64 around which revolves autonomy and rationality as a 
foundation for human dignity. Why does thinking about humanity involve considering man, and 
especially his protection in case of threat? Respect for human dignity is the first requirement of 
the right and also dependent on personal security in real life.  
When applied to refugee situations, the right acquires a particular and more significant 
content. In a situation of physical threat and material deprivation, respect for dignity appeals to 
the satisfaction of basic material needs and respect for the integrity of the individual. When all 
are put together, respect for the human person induces, in this case, the qualification for asylum. 
                                                          
63 Many books describe the different befallen and potential disasters. I refute their natural or non-natural-anthropic 
classification on the grounds that whatever catastrophe happens, man will always a role therein, either because he 
has made it possible, or he favored the occurrence of the disaster, or his action has increased tenfold the effects of 
the disaster. 
64 J.E Atwell, Ends and Principles in Kant’s Moral Thought  Vol 22 (Dordrecht: Springer, 1986) at 105-137. 
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The need for asylum is the first element and the pillar of protection sought in fleeing away from 
harm. The right to seek asylum and the right to be granted asylum is the first right that 
environmental refugees need. Therefore, the international law-making system has the 
responsibility to recognize that there is a real need to protect populations living in total material 
and legal deprivation. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and subsequent international 
human rights texts recognize the “inherent dignity of all members of the human family”65 as the 
cornerstone of all human rights.66 Every person should be treated with dignity, and seen as 
having rights in the context of human rights instruments intended to achieve self-respect.67 
Respect for human dignity is therefore the first condition for dignified individual and collective 
life. Refugees deserve no less. They should be treated humanely, and all their rights should be 
respected.  
Respect for the person individually or as part of a group suggests in its negative version 
freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment, xenophobia, racial, gender, 
religious and other forms of discrimination. It means, in positive terms, respect for fundamental 
intangible rights like freedom of thought, free speech, freedom of association, religion, and 
freedom of information. These rights and freedoms are all contained in the UDHR. Emphasis is 
to be put on the importance of respect for human dignity in the case of environmental refugees in 
particular, considering that they are in a precarious situation, weakened and susceptible of easy 
abuse. But dignity is the very essence of man, while the satisfaction of his needs, although 
essential, is not particular to him.68 
The material version of dignity induces an extensive conception of the subsistence 
minimum in compliance with the host environment. Catering for the physical needs of 
environmental refugees is a necessity without which the entire status loses its meaning. It 
induces the construction of sufficiently large camps, their installation on safe ground, their 
supply with drinking water, food, fuels, physical and health organization, in living areas, the 
                                                          
65 That is how begins the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in San Francisco August 
10, 1948. 
66 A. Schweitzer, Vivre, Espaces libres, (Albin Michel, 1970) at 228; Le droit d’être un homme, Anthologie 
mondiale de la liberté, J. Hersch Ed. JC Lattes, UNESCO, Paris, 1990 at 588. 
67 A. Camus, “The Only Dignity of Man: The Tenacious Revolt Against His Condition” and Pascal, “The Whole 
Dignity of Man Lies in Thought”. 
68 M.L. Balanda, “Le droit de vivre at 33” in Daniel Prémont (ed)  Essais sur le concept de ‘droit de vivre’ in 
Memory of Y. Khushalani (Brussels: Bruylant, 1988) at 321. 




establishment of adequate health care for the treatment of existing diseases and for the 
prevention of epidemics and possible diseases. All of this requires adapted human and material 
logistics. The location of the host camp is very important as refugees have been often placed in 
risk areas near the areas where fightings or guerrillas are conducted.69 
The implementation of the recognition, to every human, of his dignity passes, even for 
refugees, by a wide application of the principle of non-refoulement most often expressed 
negatively, requiring, in its conventional sense, that a refugee is neither expelled nor sent back to 
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or social group.70 This transposed definition of Article 33-
1 of the 1951 Convention presents a ban on returning (refouler) individually refugees. 
The principle of non-refoulement would mean, in the case of environmental refugees, that 
a State shall not expel, nor convey, in any manner whatsoever, refugees to territories where their 
life or safety is threatened because of the ecological disaster and its dangerous effects. It induces 
that a State cannot deny access to its territory the victims of an ecological catastrophe, no border 
closure, frank or disguised, to environmental refugees, being acceptable, States have the duty to 
temporarily accommodate environmental refugees victims of an ecological disaster. 
For the purpose of this article, it is important to conceive the principle of non-refoulement 
collectively, a direct consequence of the collective nature of the victim, and to renew the formal 
prohibition of refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement is absolute, admitting no 
reservations or limits as provided in the 1951 Convention. Its content requires, however, a 
precise substantive definition.  
Is the principle of non-refoulement applicable to all persons claiming to be victims of an 
ecological disaster, regardless of the medium that allowed them to escape? Is there a way to 
distinguish according to the nature of the means of escape? Those arriving by land, mostly on 
foot, perhaps by bus, bicycle, car, or even by train, do not raise any particular doubts, I think, 
these means of transport being so widespread that they appear normal to banality. However, 
                                                          
69 J. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
70 Article 33-1 of the 1951 Convention, entitled “Prohibition of expulsion or refoulement”; K. Röhl, “Fleeing 
Violence and Poverty: Non-Refoulement Obligations Under the European Convention of Human Rights” (UNHCR, 
January 2005, Working Paper No. 111); J. Crisp, “A New Asylum Paradigm? Globalization, Migration and the 
Uncertain Future of the International Refugee Regime” (December 2003, Working Paper No. 100). 
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reducing the benefit of the status of environmental refugees to the only people fleeing on foot 
would be anachronistic, since environmental refugees fleeing a brutal destruction of their 
environment would use the most practical means available immediately. The means of transport 
used does not, in this case, pose any particular problems to the extent that the movement stops 
when a venue is reached. But people fleeing by sea may pose some other questions. 
The issue of people fleeing a serious danger by sea has arisen about the Indochinese 
fleeing the peninsula by boat. Is the fact of fleeing a contaminated territory by boat inconsistent 
with the notion of environmental refugees? The rescue of ships and people in need on the high 
seas is a universally diffused, accepted and respected rule of customary international law.71 With 
this principle in mind, the question resurfaces when it comes to offload the people: what status 
and therefore what rights do they have in the host country? Since the causes of departure, 
destruction or contamination of the environment led to the forced departure of the population, 
does the usual means of transportation to escape matter and to what extent? 
More than the transportation itself, the important thing is the distance traveled and the 
chosen docking location: if the boat has rallied the nearest healthy coast or among the closest, the 
flight by boat turns comparable to an exodus by land, the aim being the survival and the safety of 
the victims.72 If, by contrast, the boat crossed the seas to a distant destination, of course less 
logic, it appears that on the desire to escape the disaster was superimposed that of trying one’s 
luck elsewhere, motivation and behavior similar to economic immigration. The collective nature 
of the flight and the objective causes of departure could, however, obliterate the distance traveled 
and the motivation to find better living conditions, on condition of concrete assessment of the 
situation.  
The fact that people have used a boat to flee is, therefore, not in itself a sufficient ground 
liable to prohibit the recognition of the status of environmental refugees to these people, even 
less that the sea sometimes is the only means used in the event of rising sea levels, floods, or 
rupture of a dam. The relevant authority will have to assess specifically the elements specific to 
each situation, with, of course, a sovereign power.  
                                                          
71 See I. Papanicolopulu, “The Duty to Rescue At Sea, in Peacetime and in War: A General Overview” (2016) 98:2 
Intl Rev of the Red Cross 491. 
72 In this regard, Albanians docking in southern Italy rallied the nearest country hoping to find some security, see Le 
Monde, 17 and 18 March 1997, without prejudging the nature of people fleeing . But see also T. Malaspina, “Italy, 
Albanian Exodus? A mafia colonization (1997) Espresso, Rome, reproduced in Le Courrier International, No. 334, 
(27 March-2 April 1997) at 13. 




Does the fact of chartering a plane and flying through the air close the door to the status 
of environmental refugees? The plane, as a means of transportation, does prejudge neither the 
causes for departure nor the conditions of arrival. However, the act of taking a plane induces a 
remote destination. But environmental refugees flee, hypothetically, a severe but localized 
situation inducing a priori a movement limited in space. It is not clear whether beyond this 
perimeter the displacement meets the same motivation. However, the aircraft being the most 
rapid means of public transport, it may be the most appropriate in emergency situations, by air 
contamination, for example in case of chemical or nuclear pollution. The plane has become a 
means of transport so common that it does not seem that we should reserve it a special attention. 
It is by contrast especially suitable for large emergency situations—in case of emergency like 
civil war in a country, States evacuate their nationals by air. Therefore, it seems consistent to 
apply the same treatment to environmental refugees.  
Where will this plane or these planes offload their passengers? These passengers are not 
illegal in the sense in which many countries understand, within the Schengen area for example.73 
These are refugees and the difference is essential. Their first reason is the flight for survival, not 
the desire to emigrate elsewhere. The principle of first asylum takes on its full force, as practiced 
in African countries but also in India for Burmese refugees or Pakistan for Afghan refugees. 
People flee a mortal danger—they have the right to be welcomed and protected outside the 
contaminated area. The countries have a duty to welcome these people faster, even then move 
them into a more suitable location. The principle of first asylum contains both support and 
protection against the danger fled.  
The right not to be sent back means the ability for people fleeing the consequences of an 
ecological disaster to access a non-hazardous healthy territory, beyond the devastated area. Non-
refoulement includes physical access, that is, non-closure of the territory and the border, and the 
lack of intimidation to impress or deter refugees from entering. This right induces, in positive 
terms, allowing refugee populations access to the territory by providing them with a home 
ground, a necessary corollary that the right to asylum is as discussed below.  
                                                          
73 Europe: un espace ‘de soft-apartheid’ Schengen, Dublin, Maastricht … L’esprit des conventions, Plein droit, 
(Paris, No. 20, 1993) at 6-70. 
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The principle of non-refoulement has, in the case of environmental refugees, a collective 
dimension, again, applying to the whole group that can be accepted only in block, any 
differentiation between individuals therein being impossible. This principle appears, in this 
collective version, widely used in the South, while Northern countries are sticking to an 
individualistic conception74 impossible to apply to environmental refugees, on risk of emptying 
the proposed status of any sense. 
 
V. HOW TO ORGANIZE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION 
 
The envisaged status of environmental refugees would be material because, unlike conventional 
refugees for whom the existing status replaces the faulty legal relationship with their country of 
nationality or habitual residence with a new legal relationship with the host State, this link is not 
broken. There is no need for a new legal relationship, the former remaining, although the disaster 
has rendered it inoperative. It is therefore necessary to consider the establishment of a material 
status during the time when victims remain environmental refugees, which would consider the 
temporary inefficiency of the protection of the State of origin in order to provide material 
assistance to refugees without replacing the legal relationship that continues and will later 
resume its full force. 
A. MATERIAL STATUS 
It is a matter of providing solutions that cater for the needs of recognized environmental 
refugees, by means of “light” survival as it is temporary: logistics adapted according to the 
situation being required to install the camps, to supply them with food, drinking water, kitchen 
equipment, fuels, to allow a healthy lifestyle through latrines, a drainage system, as well as care, 
drugs and vaccines to prevent epidemics in particular. The experience of the UNHCR and the 
ICRC particularly is, in this respect, valuable for assessing the population, negotiate the 
establishment of camps with host countries and regions, allowing an organized facility and to 
repatriate the refugees to their place of normal life when camps will be closed, and to limit 
environmental disturbances on the venue. The strictly material character of the status partakes of 
the temporary nature of the reception of environment refugees. 
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B. TEMPORARY STATUS 
The status of environmental refugees aims, in principle, at protecting these people by the time 
the effects of the disaster are dissipating and a safe return is possible, the resettlement of refugees 
on their traditional living places resulting in the loss of the qualification of environmental 
refugees. Although this principle may seem clear, it nonetheless stumbles on the issue of the 
permanent environmental disaster that makes the place in which it occurred uninhabitable for a 
long time. Is a time scale possible for environmental refugees? Can they remain so indefinitely? 
If not, what do they become then, in the case of temporary status? 
The cases of massive deforestation, nuclear or chemical disasters75 resulting in long-
lasting water or soil pollution during the storage or disposal of hazardous waste, global warming, 
rising water levels, for example, are all situations that generate the permanent displacement. It 
seems, for various reasons, difficult to conceive a status of permanent environmental refugees: 
- A status conceived to regulate a temporary situation cannot last more than a generation; 
- A permanent departure requires, too, a permanent solution; 
- It is important to differentiate between temporary environmental refugees and permanent 
refugees, each requiring a regime adapted to their respective situations, otherwise the status runs 
the risk of not being useful to anyone. 
So, on what basis to establish the distinction and what are the consequences attached to 
it? The distinction between temporary and permanent environmental refugees seems able to 
settle only on a case by case basis. It might be possible to set a time below which we are in a 
situation of environmental refugees as here conceived, and beyond, permanent refugees; but 
what time to fix? 5 years? 10 years? 25 years? More or less? The time for a generation, that is 
about 25 years, seems very long for the displaced population as well as for the host State and the 
international community through the organization in charge, and five years is short to restore a 
badly damaged environment. While most disasters are absorbed quickly, in a few days or 
months, we cannot exclude in advance some non-permanent disasters that may take long to 
disappear. Shouldn’t one consider an environmentally stateless status when a population is 
deprived of its State because the latter has physically disappeared? 
                                                          
75 Chernobyl, 10 years later, Le Monde and Libération, 10-30 April 1996. About these disasters in the former USSR, 
see in particular B. Komarov, “Le rouge et le vert, La destruction de la nature en U.R.S.S” (Seuil, Paris, 1981) at 
214. 
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It seems premature to answer from now, many views and discussions appearing, in this 
case, essential. The only option in respect of permanent refugees would perhaps be relocation, 
that is, to find a place that could accommodate them permanently. The role of the international 
community in the search for a long-term solution is essential, implementing active solidarity to 
take responsibility for the relocation of the population with a lasting, humane and realistic 
solution. Can’t one imagine a body responsible for proposing permanent relocation solutions to 
then be submitted to the States directly concerned and to environmental refugees? Everything 
depends on the will of the international community to address the problem.  
The treatment of environmental refugees should be framed by legal rules while I have, 
paradoxically, emphasized the material nature of the status, refusing to replace the natural legal 
relationship between the State and its citizens. I should, however, insist on the legal nature of the 
proposed status: a “legal” status induces qualification and treatment of refugees rooted in the 
legal norm, beyond a factual practice. 
C. UNITARY STATUS 
In recent years, the issue of “climate refugees”, “hunger refugees”, “environmental refugees” etc 
… attracted the attention of researchers and set back from politics. Various theories are 
emerging. Some argue for a categorization of refugees according to the causes of the disaster at 
the origin of their departure. Thus, of “climate refugees”,76 some consider necessary to imagine a 
protection for victims of global warming. And of “chemical refugees”, one could imagine a 
special status for victims of a chemical accident like Minamata, Seveso, Bhopal, Feyzin, or a 
nuclear accident like Chernobyl.77 It is permissible to imagine all the possible differentiations. 
The major risk is the fact of classifying, sorting and selecting that leads to bureaucratic problems: 
who is competent to “choose” the beneficiaries? This would lead, as for the 1951 convention-
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type refugees, to an individual procedure or a procedure with individual tendencies, totally 
inadequate, which would empty any substance out of the envisaged protection regime.  
In this regard, it seems more realistic to consider a “collective” status of environmental 
refugees, that is to say, a status that does not distinguish between the causes of the departure and 
the disaster, but which acts on its consequences. The concept of “hunger refugees”78 has been 
proposed in international circles. If we can talk endlessly about the implications of a particular 
word, it is clear that as soon as a person or a group of people is hungry, that is, that the 
environment is not able to feed them, we are very close to the concept presented here of 
environmental refugees.79  
The idea supporting hunger refugees and environmental refugees is one: when a 
population is seriously endangered by its environment, it must be able to find the support of the 
international community as a whole. It is the responsibility and accountability of the international 
community, States and relevant organizations, including the UNHCR, to get around a table in 
order to honor their first mission: respect for the dignity of each and every one in all situations, 
especially the most serious. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The legal protection of environmentally displaced persons at the international level poses a 
serious problem, especially in view of the legal vacuum due to the lack of protection in current 
international instruments and the reluctance of the international community to commit to clear 
legislation on migration in relations to the environment. It is clear that the protection instruments 
in force today regarding the status of refugees, human rights and disaster law do not effectively 
protect the environmentally displaced. It is this legal vacuum thus found that has opened the field 
                                                          
78 Jean Ziegler, Press Conference, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, October 26, 2007; J. Ziegler, Les 
réfugiés de la faim, in Le Monde Diplomatique, March 2008; A UN expert called for immediate end to the 
persecution of hunger refugees on Chinese soil, E/C.12/Q/CHN/1, China. 07/06/2004, CESCR Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 
79 Christelle COURNIL “Vers la reconnaissance du ’réfugié écologique’”? “Vers la reconnaissance du ’réfugié 
écologique’?” (Revue du droit public, July-August 2006, No. 4) at 1035; Pierre Mazzega “Catastrophes écologiques 
et flux migratoires : Comment protéger les ’réfugiés écologiques’?”, in Revue européenne du droit de 
l’environnement, No. 4 (December 2006) at 417-427; Idem, “Réflexions prospectives sur une protection juridique 
des réfugiés écologiques”, (2007) 23:1 Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales 7; P. Mazzega, “Comment 
protéger les “réfugiés écologiques”?” (2007) 23:1 Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 7-34. 
24 THE TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW                                              [VOL 6] 
for a strong doctrinal controversy between supporters of lege lata and those of lege ferenda, a 
controversy reinforced above all by the lack of consideration, in the analyzes, of the values of 
charity and solidarity as well as the concept of humanity, as the basis of effective legal 
protection. 
And yet, these environmentally displaced people, in fact these refugees, are an expanding 
reality that cannot be ignored. The condition of environmental refugees has been analyzed here 
from a philosophical-legal perspective. On the basis of the available reflections, the condition of 
environmental refugees has been presented as precarious on the legal plane, the refugee 
representing an otherness unassimilable by the notions of the established order. As an alterity, he 
makes an ethical category that has the potential to make it possible to judge the validity of 
current international law. In fact, it is the relationship between law and environmental refugees 
that revives the debate about the connection between law and human life, because life without 
law is a life abandoned and condemned to live in the condition of faction whose exception 
becomes the norm since, in the void created by the absence of law, the arbitrariness of a 
sovereign will be queen.  
The vacuum condition in which the environmental refugee lives appears as a threshold 
from which it is necessary to think of a new law, namely the adoption of a new convention 
recognizing the international legal status of the environmentally displaced. This proposal lays the 
groundwork for further research on concrete legal solutions to the international protection of 
environmentally displaced people in a number of ways. First of all, it is necessary to fill the legal 
void found by many scholars where they recognize the fact that the Geneva Convention of July 
1951 on refugees is legally inadequate since it does not concern environmental refugees. It does 
not consider the fact that, by destroying a place, the ecological disaster reaches everyone usually 
inhabiting it, whence all victims should also benefit from the proposed protection. It applies only 
to people crossing a border, individuals, not groups, and no amendment should be made to it at 
the risk of weakening it. The new instrument should be based on solid legal foundations, in 
particular the international conventions on human rights, which must be applied in all 
circumstances, both in normal times and in times of disaster, the right to life which “is also a 
right to survival in the event of a disaster”: organizing the flight is a condition for survival and as 
specified in article 4, 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, this right to 
life is one of those to which States cannot derogate, even in cases of “public emergency”. The 




new instrument should also be based on a series of declarations, starting from the Rio 
Declaration of 1992 in principle 18, which stipulates the duty of ecological assistance by stating 
that: “Every effort shall be made by the international community to help States so afflicted”. 
In addition, to ensure its implementation, the new instrument should also stipulate the 
creation of appropriate institutions that can respond in a concrete way to the need to protect 
environmental refugees. It must also appeal to the international community for more solidarity, 
more responsibility and above all not to regress but to evolve. Indeed, international law as a 
whole must evolve to meet the different challenges of this century as well as those of the coming 
centuries. The fight against environmental damage resulting in the massive displacement of the 
population is at the center of these challenges. New concepts must be invented, new institutions 
created, and especially sufficient funds collected.  
Does this seem realistic? Will today’s society, aware of profound changes that lie ahead, 
have the courage and strength of utopia required to lay the foundations of an ecological haven? 
These elements should allow States to work out a status of environmental refugees. A fair and 
well-functioning protection of environmental refugees must rely on clear principles and rights, 
established and adopted. 
 
 
 
